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The three Rs of Russell and Burch - Reduce, Replace, Refine - are 
widely agreed maxims of animal-based science.  The morally-concerned 
researcher tries to reduce  both the number of animals used in science, 
and the impacts of procedures on them.  Animals are to be replaced, 
wherever possible, by techniques that do not use animals. Techniques 
and procedures are to be refined as much as possible to minimise harms.   
Implementing these maxims is desirable given that much animal-based 
science seeks to promote knowledge through the deliberate and 
intentional infliction of harms on other living things, often for the sake of 
studying these harms themselves.   
 
When we try to engage in moral discussion about which pieces of 
research using animals should or should not be permitted, we run up 
against significant problems.  In this article, I identify three areas where 
doubts are specially acute, and suggest that these can be thought of as the 
three Cs of animal experimentation ethics. The three Cs are not maxims, 
however. Instead, they indicate areas of difficulty and uncertainty that 
have to be negotiated before conclusions can be reached. The three Cs, I 
argue, should be taken together with three other dimensions of moral 
thinking - details, intuitions and principles.  When all these dimensions 
are plotted, the result is a space of moral argument and perplexity.  By 
drawing attention to some features of this space, I am able in the present 
article to indicate hidden weaknesses in the present systems for 
regulating animal research.  
 
Reason, feeling and ethics 
 
By intuition  is meant the sense or feeling we get in a situation that things 
are, morally speaking, right or wrong. We often express this sense of 
moral rightness or wrongness even when we cannot give a very specific, 
reasoned account of why we have the feeling.  But ethics is not just a 
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matter of feelings.  We all recognize the existence of moral rules or 
principles, some of which can be rationally justified.  Some of the Ten 
Commandments of Christianity, or the rule that we should behave 
towards others as we would expect them to behave towards us, are rules 
that many people would accept as guides for action.  When we give 
reasons for why an action is right or wrong, we may cite one of these 
general guiding principles. 
 
How are the two ingredients, reason and feeling, principles and 
intuitions, to be combined?  One project of moral theory is to see if a set 
of principles can be found which gives a rational justification for our 
moral feelings. The general idea of this project is that it should be 
possible to put the two ingredients into balance with each other. If a 
principle (e.g. ‘Always tell the truth’) leads to behaviour that does not 
feel morally right, then the principle has to be modified. Conversely, if 
our intuitions are out of keeping with a widely-agreed principle, then we 
can try to educate our intuitions so they harmonize with the principle. In 
the jargon of theorists, this self-conscious balancing act is an attempt to 
find a reflective equilibrium between principles and intuitions.1  
 
For many scientists, the introduction of feelings, or a sense of right and 
wrong, into discussions is uncomfortable. With the exception of some 
parts of psychology, feelings are not normally the object of scientific 
study and the ‘official’ methodology of scientific investigation leaves 
little - if any - room for emotions. The scientist is supposed to deal with 
theory and evidence in a rational, objective manner, unmoved by 
passions. The supposition is seldom confirmed in real life. In discussions 
about controversial areas of work, natural scientists become just as 
vehement as anyone else. But, despite this, they may at other times try to 
dismiss ‘emotive language’, as if matters of right and wrong, duty and 
integrity, are not connected with feelings in any way. Modern moral 
philosophy shares a part of the scientists’ attitudes here. It does not rule 
out the importance of feelings to morality. But it encourages rational, and 
impartial, reflection on how feelings can be harmonized with principles. 
Moral theory sometimes asks us to step aside from our passionate 
commitments, enthusiasms and deeply felt convictions in order to reflect 
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on the extent to which they can be brought into conformity with 
rationally-justifiable principles. 
 
The quest for reflective equilibrium is not always successful. Even when 
a balance is found, this is not the end of moral debate. People who share 
the same intuitions and principles can still give different judgments on 
the same case. For example, a researcher and an anti-vivisectionist may 
share the same moral point of view. One of them, however, believes that 
the consciousness and sensation of a certain non-human species is very 
close to that of humans. The other does not believe this at all. Let us call 
this a disagreement about the details of the case. The term ‘details’ is 
used loosely here to cover matters of belief, opinion, probability, theory 
and speculation, as well as the known and agreed facts of a situation. In 
this sense of the term, many of the sources of argument about animal 
research are concerned with the details. Notice that different opinions 
about what the details of a case are will often result in different moral 
evaluations. 
 
There are thus at least three dimensions to be explored in moral 
discussions: details, intuitions and principles. (Buning et al.2 refer to 
‘facts’ where I have talked about the ‘details’ of a case).  Being aware of 
these can be of practical help in resolving disagreements.  Often, the 
stumbling block is a question of fact, theory or opinion not of values or 
ethics. For example, I recall one occasion in which an experimentation 
ethics committee was uncertain about approving a project involving the 
study of a particular frog species found only in one habitat in Australia.   
As part of the research a number of the animals were to be removed from 
their environment for laboratory study. After some discussion, it became 
clear that the major issues in the minds of those with worries about the 
project were two: the relative abundance of the frogs, and the impact of 
the investigation on the rest of the habitat. Once these details  had been 
identified, it became relatively easy to establish parameters under which 
the project would be able to qualify for approval. 
 
Not all issues can be settled so smoothly. In particular, there will be 
opportunities for endless conflict on matters of detail which are 
themselves the subject of different opinions and theories - for example 
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the intelligence of birds, or primates, in relation to humans, or the 
claimed benefits of research. Principles and intuitions also collide in 
fascinating and complex ways. But it would be wrong to think that 
contest is the only problem to be encountered in discussions of ethics.   
There are three Cs central to ethics -  contest, context and complexity.    




It is apparent that ethical issues are often contested and some of the 
problems by which we are most puzzled have no agreed moral answer.  
This is obviously true of the debates about euthanasia, abortion or 
screening for genetic diseases. It is not just the factual or theoretical 
details that are disputed in these cases. Instead there is often a debate 
between fundamental ethical orientations or principles. In the case of 
research involving animals this contest is widely recognized. Nearly 
everyone agrees on some of the factual and theoretical details, for 
example, that many of the animals used by researchers have a degree of 
consciousness and the capacity for pain and pleasure. When Tom Regan 
writes that animals are subjects of a life, many laboratory scientists 
would agree. And when Peter Singer points to the existence of animal 
suffering we can all think of cases where this has happened.3  So, what is 
it that divides Regan and Singer from those who support the continued 
use of animals in research?    
 
At present, the argument between supporters and opponents of animal 
research seems mainly centred on specific details (matters of fact and 
theory). Thereafter, there is a second layer of disagreement about the 
ethical stance that is appropriate in the light of the facts. As to details, 
there are observations and speculations about the degree of similarity 
between human and animal consciousness, sensations and lifestyles. On 
the ethical side, there is contest over whether, for example, it is 
legitimate to inflict avoidable harms on members of one species in order 
to secure a benefit to members of another. To disentangle the factual, 
intuitive and principled issues at stake is a large task and lies beyond the 
focus of the present article.  However, what is said later about levels of 





Some of the sciences, for example, chemistry and physics, aim to identify 
and understand fundamental mechanisms which operate in the same way 
in all contexts. The laws in these sciences are global - even universal (in 
its literal sense) - in scope. To the extent that they succeed in describing 
the universe, they have to be mutually consistent. By contrast, social life 
for human beings is not subject to universal unchanging laws. As soon as 
we specify a possible principle of conduct, we can think of a context 
where it seems not to apply or to be in conflict with some other precept. 
For example, suppose we accept the following maxims: first, that we 
should be truthful with each other; second, that we should avoid 
unnecessary harms to another agent.  It is not hard to think of a situation 
where telling the truth may do more harm than staying silent. So, the two 
precepts come into conflict. So, should we try to live in keeping with just 
a single principle? This would be a bad idea for many reasons. In any 
case, it does not solve the present problem.  Even if we limited ourselves 
to the principle of avoiding harm, we encounter conflicts. Consider, for 
example, a case where doing harm to one agent prevents a greater harm 
to another. It looks as if it might be impossible to live strictly in keeping 
with even one principle. For this reason, moral precepts are not to be 
regarded as strict and exceptionless. Instead, they always have to be 
interpreted according to the specific case we are dealing with and the 
context in which we find ourselves. 
 
How does context, the second of the three Cs, affect animal research?   
Many laboratory procedures are more or less routine, for example those 
involved in antibody production, blood sampling, anaesthesia or 
euthanasia. However even in these cases, there are often choices about 
where to draw the blood from, or which adjuvant to use to stimulate the 
antibody response. Since any of these procedures involve a cost to the 
animal, it has to be asked whether there is a real need for this procedure 
at all in the context of the overall research program. 
 
Contextual issues associated with these routine activities are regularly 
discussed in institutional ethics committees. Not all countries have such 
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watchdog bodies, but in Australia, for example, where an animal ethics 
committee system is well-established,4 questions about the context of 
procedures are standard fare in discussion of whether to approve a 
particular proposal. Committees consider in detail whether a given 
procedure, taking place in a particular project, is justified in light of the 
aims of the project, the potential benefits, and the skills of the 
researchers. These are not the only contextual issues. Others may include 
how often the procedure is to be used, or the maximum exposure of any 
given animal to a particular imposition.   
 
It should be noticed that laying down standard operating procedures does 
not preclude a consideration of contextual issues. Any standard protocol 
for bleeding, pain relief or anaesthesia has to allow for exceptions.  For 
example, in Australia, ether is no longer regarded as a generally 
appropriate anaesthetic agent for small animals. Experience has shown, 
however, that for some applications it remains the anaesthetic of choice 
provided it is used with care in a situation where appropriate precautions 





The third 'C' is complexity.  Actions and decisions are seldom simple: as 
the point of view from which we describe something changes we become 
aware of this. Lunging at someone with a dagger can at the same time be 
assassinating an emperor and starting a revolution.    These three 
descriptions of essentially the same physical act draw attention to the 
layers of complexity inherent in it. Until we have thought about what we 
do from more than one standpoint, we can easily convince ourselves that 
our actions are simpler than they are. Consider a case where a tiny pump 
has to be installed under the skin of a rat.To suture the wound tightly can 
ensure that the pump does not become dislodged. But it can also cause 
extra post-operative discomfort; by focusing only on getting the sutures 
tight enough the researchers may overlook the other aspects of what they 
are doing. When they recognize that getting the sutures tight may not be 
getting them right then they have started to think about the other aspects 
 46 
of what they are doing outside the province of science and the aims of 
the research they are engaged in.   
 
Complexity refers to the capacity for a situation to be multi-layered.   
From one point of view, implanting the pump securely is central to 
getting the science done. A different layer of considerations is concerned 
with the welfare and comfort of the animals. Focusing on one layer to the 
exclusion of others is fundamental to many conflict situations. Members 
of ethics committee who have a background in animal care and advocacy 
will - from the point of view of researchers - sometimes seem to ignore 
the significance and excitement of the science.   From an outsider’s point 
of view, the scientists can seem peculiarly indifferent to the pain or 
discomfort of their animals, since their focus is on the demands of the 
research and the interest of the results they are achieving. The layer on 
which we focus in discussing a case often reflects our own interests. To 
grasp the situation in its complexity will often require us to pay attention 
to levels and layers that have not previously come to our attention. 
 
Problems of levels and layers are not the same as those of context. We 
can see this by focusing on just one context, say the housing 
requirements for a specific group of experimental animals. Here there 
will typically be different attitudes taken by investigators and animal care 
staff. The researchers will normally concentrate largely on the health 
status of the animals, ease of access, freedom from infection during any 
healing process that is to occur and other matters that are central to the 
smooth operation of their research. By contrast, care staff will often be 
more aware of lighting levels, environmental enrichment, the suitability 
of bedding materials and requirements for play and companionship. So 
there are at least these two layers of complexity in such a case. 
 
The two perspectives are often complementary. Adopting both provides 
us with a richer understanding of the situation of the animals, care staff 
and investigators. Sometimes, however, the demands of one perspective 
will be in conflict with the demands of another. Loose bedding, for 
example, may be desirable for the species in question, but interfere with 
the results being studied. A case like this may sometimes pose a priority 
question: which perspective is to be given authority? In a real situation, 
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the complexity of the issue would not normally be exhausted by 
considering only two perspectives. Other layers to be remembered would 
include the nature of the proposed research, its position in a larger 
intellectual framework, the career interests of investigators and care staff, 
and so on. Philosophers sometimes distinguish ‘thick’ from ‘thin’ 
understandings of people and situations. Focusing on just one layer or 
one dimension of a situation gives us a thin account of it.    Recognizing 
the existence of complexity is to recognize that any research situation is a 
‘thick’ one in this sense. 
 
The problems of ethics 
 
Once the three Cs are recognized, it is easy to see that they will interact 
with details, intuitions and principles to define an area of ethical 
bewilderment and fascination.  For example, we may encounter 
disagreement not only about the appropriate anaesthetic to use in a 
particular procedure (a contextual issue) but also about the relevance of 
the procedure to testing the hypothesis under consideration (which arises 
from thinking about another dimension of a complex situation).  
Likewise, two people may agree in principle that a certain procedure is 
ethically acceptable; they may still disagree over the issue of whether it 
is right to use the procedure in a teaching demonstration as well as in a 
piece of research. This latter, contextual disagreement will be a further 
difference of principle.    
 
As already emphasized there are no exceptionless moral principles.  In 
this way, ethics is more like toxicology than chemistry. But it lacks even 
the regularities found in toxicology. Moral precepts are general guides to 
action.  But the most difficult moral problems come up either in 
particular situations or in specific classes of case (e.g., abortion, 
euthanasia, genetic screening, antibody production).  As we add detail to 
the cases under review, we develop two things simultaneously. First, 
context becomes more clear, and the various dimensions of complexity in 
the situation start to be revealed.  But, second, this often opens the way 
to further conflict involving facts, intuitions and principles. 
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Luckily, there are many situations in which the right course of action is 
clear, and the addition of further details makes no difference to the 
verdict.  So there are many occasions where, for example, we recognize 
that it is right to do some harm to achieve some good (for example, 
pushing someone out of the path of a life-threatening danger).  But the 
scientific use of animals is an excellent exemplar of how agreement on 
principles does not systematically  translate to agreement on cases. 
 
Same question - different aspects 
 
As we uncover a situation in more detail, the scope for ethical 
disagreement can increase. In this section I want to draw attention to two 
different ways we can think about one general issue: the scale of animal-
based research.  In a previous paper5 I used existing sources in the 
literature together with estimates supplied by Mark Matfield and Andrew 
Rowan to arrive at the following estimate of scientific uses of animals: 
 
 United States       22 million   (1986) 
 European Union     11.8 million  (1991) 
 Canada      2.1 million (1993) 
 Switzerland      0.86 million (1992) 
 Australia      0.75 million  (1989) 
 Japan      2.5 million 
 
 Rest of the world     10  million  (estimate) 
 
This gives a total world animal use in research for the early 1990s of 
around 50 million - or, allowing for discrepancies and underestimates in 
returns, perhaps 55 to 60 million. Notice that some writers would argue 
that a more accurate estimate would be double this figure. If we related 
these numbers to populations, we find significant variations among 
countries. For example, in most of the industrial world, animals used in 
research per million population varies between an upper value of around 
120,000 (the United States) and a lower value of around 14,000 (Spain).5  
Again, within countries there are divergences in the distribution of 
animal use among commercial, government and university laboratories. 
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A noteworthy fact is that in nearly all countries for which there exists 
reasonable data, it appears that animal use in science has declined very 
significantly since 1970, when - again on conservative estimates - total 
world usage was probably around 110 - 120 million. Let us assume that 
the fewer animals used in research the better. It follows that the situation 
by 1990 seems to be much better than the situation in 1970.   But this is 
only one aspect of the question we started with: the scale of animal use in 
science. 
 
To see this issue from a different perspective, consider the following data 
drawn from Nicoll and Russell.6 This time, we are considering all forms 
of animal use in the United States: 
 
 Numbers of Animals Used Annually in the United States 
         Percentage of total 
 
Food 6 086 000 000 96.5% 
Hunting 165 000 000 2.6% 
Killed in animal shelters 27 000 000 .4% 
Fur industry 11 000 000 .2% 
All teaching and research 20 000 000 .3% 
 
The US Department of Agriculture figures show that Nicoll and Russell 
appear to have taken no account of animal slaughter for food apart from 
chickens.7    
 
The figures in other categories are no more reliable than those in the first 
row. The figure for teaching and research is likely an underestimate, and 
the deaths in shelters have been extrapolated from a very small and 
untypical data set and so are entirely unreliable.   Despite these 
drawbacks, the figures can be the basis of some generalization. 
Extrapolation would suggest that in global terms the scientific use of 
animals represents no more than .25% of total animal killing by human 
beings. In fact, if we take into account further impacts such as fishing, 
land clearance and so on then .25% will grossly overestimate the 
contribution of teaching and research to animal suffering and death. 
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These new figures provide a different view on the original question:  the 
scale of animal research. Animals used in research count for a minute 
fraction of human impacts on animals. Their total elimination from 
science would have virtually no effect at all on human-induced suffering 
and death in the animal world. The fact that such animal use has declined 
by 50% over the last twenty five years would now - for some people - 
hardly seem significant at all. Looking at the data from this new point of 
view, the same people might ask why research involving animals is so 
heavily-regulated and widely-debated. Others (including myself) may 
claim that the allocation of significant resources in this area reveals that 
animal use in the sciences poses ethical questions of a different sort from 
those posed by other impacts on animal lives. I have written on this 
matter in other papers, and will not follow it further here. 
 
What I have tried to show in the present section is that considering the 
numbers of animals used in research is not a simple matter. Rather, there 
are layers of complexity associated with this question. Depending on 
how we locate the issue of numbers, we may be tempted to adopt 
different perspectives, which themselves can give rise to new questions 
of detail, intuition and principle. An animal protectionist may emphasise 
the enormous scale of a world industry dedicated to harming animals for 
the sake of some dubious human benefits. An animal scientist may 
respond by indicating how tiny the proportion of animals harmed in 
research is: more than 250 battery chickens are killed for every animal 
which dies in the cause of science. Each side has a truth of sorts on its 
side. But, until each takes note of the perspective of the other, their 
engagement with the situation remains, at best, partial.            .
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Levels of concern 
 
The complexity of life is such that we can often become so engrossed in 
thinking about only one aspect of a situation that we miss other aspects 
of it. There are many other ways to think about the scale of animal 
research apart from the two given in the previous section. And there are 
many different ways to think about specific pieces of research as well.   
In this section, I develop the idea of complexity further in order to draw 
attention to a hidden area in the animals debate.  Once this is brought to 
light, it becomes obvious that present methods of regulating animal 
research are inadequate. It follows from what I argue that there is no 
place in which certain issues of fundamental importance can be debated. 
The only people with an influence on these matters are the animal-using 
scientists themselves.  To a certain extent, then, scientific animal use is 
running free from social control and proper ethical scrutiny. 
 
To identify the hidden area, let us put ourselves in the place of a 
researcher. Suppose I am committed to a worthwhile research program 
carried out to the highest standards. One day, I start to think about the 
large number of other programs which failed to get funding at the time 
my own one was funded. I follow this up by considering whether the 
proportion of the research dollar going to the sort of work I am engaged 
in is being well spent in comparison to how it might have been spent (say 
in epidemiological or public health research, or in preventive medicine 
programs). I have a nagging doubt that something is wrong: might it not 
be better if the money being spent on my research were going to some 
other program? 
 
Notice where this chain of thought goes. It does not move immediately to 
the conclusion that there might be anything inherently wrong in what I 
am doing. In terms of the standards in my area, the research I undertake 
is of high merit, let us suppose. The ethics committee in my institution 
actually regards me as a model scientist, and I have pioneered some 
novel forms of environmental enrichment for the animals I work with. So 
there are no ethical problems about laboratory practice, the integrity of 
the research team, the standards of animal care, and so on.  Notice that it 
was not from this point of view that my concerns arose.  They involved 
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larger questions about how society is using its resources, and the 
direction that scientific research is taking. Suddenly, I reflect that this 
situation is no different from many others in which people find 
themselves. For instance, a police officer who would like to see certain 
drugs decriminalized may still work effectively and ethically as a 
member of a drug team enforcing the very laws that she would prefer to 
see changed. This looks like a similar case. The officer does everything 
right, even when there is a question hanging over whether the laws the 
officer is enforcing are themselves right. The very same behaviour which 
is right, from one perspective, is also seen as wrong from a different one. 
 
The thought experiment has illuminated an important possibility.  It may 
not be right that certain research is taking place, even when the 
researcher carrying it out is doing everything right! Any air of paradox 
about this evaporates once we see that actions are complex and can be 
viewed from more than one perspective. The second kind of rightness is 
concerned with the behaviour of the researcher, and the quality of the 
research. This is the sort of rightness which is monitored and policed in 
Australia by the animal ethics committees within institutions. These 
committees have to include members of animal protection and advocacy 
groups (as required by the national Code of Practice). As a consequence, 
approval of research projects and housing standards is subject to 
particularly tough scrutiny by people who may be in principle opposed to 
all research on live animals.  However, these people have no input to 
deciding on the first kind of rightness.  More accurately, they do not have 
input to this through their membership of institutional ethics committees. 
 
How can we start to think about the ethics of animal use away from the 
institutional perspective?  Any of a hundred examples would do, and I 
consider, for vividness, just one. For some parts of diabetes research, a 
widely-used animal model is the streptozotocin rat. Rats injected with 
streptozotocin suffer damage to the pancreas which induces diabetes.   At 
different research centres, these damaged animals are studied for the light 
they can shed on glycogen synthesis or other biochemical phenomena 
which may advance the understanding and management of diabetes in 
humans.   
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At the institutional level, ethics committees have to be aware of the 
special problems associated with streptozotocin (it is an unstable and 
dangerous substance), the special care needs of the affected animals and 
the need for research involving such high impositions on the animals to 
be of the best quality as judged by international standards. It is at this 
level of concern that the input from animal advocacy groups is mandated 
in Australia and some other countries. Where there is doubt about a 
specific research proposal, committees may rely on external referees to 
assure them of the competence of the investigator and the significance of 
the work. What is important to recognize, however, is that these 
institutional-level concerns do not give a complete answer to the 
question: ‘Is it right to undertake this piece of research?’ 
 
Here are some questions which cannot be adequately addressed as long 
as the focus is on the institutional setting:    
(1) How successful has this general line of research been in 
illuminating mechanisms, or stimulating new approaches to treatment 
and management of human diabetes?    
This question is, at best, only partially addressed at institutional level, 
and has by and large to be left to the judgment of the scientific 
community and funding bodies. The peer-review mechanism of national 
grant-awarding bodies does not normally provide for lay input or for any 
form of independent ethical scrutiny.    
(2) To what extent are animal-based studies proving currently 
productive for the general understanding of the relevant human 
biochemistry?   
This can be answered, if at all, only by considering the field of 
biochemistry as a whole at a given time. National strategy committees, or 
review sessions at international conferences, would be appropriate places 
for an explicit discussion of this topic. These normally have no animal 
protectionist input, or independent ethical scrutiny. If national or 
international review impinges on discussion at institutional level it will 
only be via the expert judgment of researchers and referees. At 
institutional levels, it has to be taken on trust that programs which 
qualify for competitive funding will be productive given the current 
directions in biochemical research. In summary, it seems that only 
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scientists themselves will ever give consideration to, and attempt answers 
for, this question. 
(3) What is the appropriate weight to be given to research on diabetes 
(including the rat model) compared with research on other human health 
problems?    
This third query is of the same kind that was put by the investigator in 
our thought experiment given above. It is only one of indefinitely many 
comparative questions which raise matters that can only be understood in 
relation to national and international trends, funding practices, and social 
analysis. Unlike the second question, this one cannot easily be fitted in to 
discussion at specialist  scientific conferences. Like the second one, if 
addressed at all, it is likely to be considered by expert groups without the 
input of lay persons and animal protection advocates. 
 
Conclusion: Arenas of conflict 
 
The previous section raises questions of context and complexity that are 
seldom addressed explicitly in the literature on animal research.  
Philosophers, obsessed with principles and ethical theories, often gloss 
over the details of how moral decisions are reached.  It is much easier to 
say that a practice is wrong than to suggest ways in which it can be made 
better. At the most general theoretical levels, there is a tendency to think 
in terms of exclusive positions: complete abolitionism at one side, and 
freedom for science on the other. Debates between such extremes are 
generally sterile, however inspirational their ideals.   Institutions, caught 
in the middle, have set up committees and adopted national standards in 
an attempt to find a way forward that respects some of the demands of 
science on the one hand and the case for animals on the other.  What I 
have argued above is that this is not enough.  The ethical scrutiny of 
scientific animal use inevitably raises questions that cannot be settled 
within the institutional context. 
 
In his address to the 10th annual Summit for the Animals on April 7, 
1995, in St. Louis, United States, Merritt Clifton (editor of Animal 
People) urged the animal protection groups to become a ‘loyal 
opposition’ to science. In a parliamentary democracy the loyal opposition 
strenuously opposes the government of the day while sharing with it 
 55 
respect for national laws, principles of democracy and due process.  
Australia is fortunate that it already has a loyal opposition, many of 
whose members sit on animal ethics committees. For them, however, the 
experience can be frustrating. Several of the high-level considerations 
that may have informed their resistance to animal research can find no 
expression at the institutional committee. When a proposal for research 
into a disease which affects only a small proportion of the population is 
put forward, there is no space for saying that the money would be better 
spent on tackling the health problems of Aboriginal communities. This is 
not an issue for a scientific establishment, like a university, to decide. 
Indeed, the funds for which the researcher is applying may well not be 
available for any other purpose.  It follows that only some of the rights 
and wrongs of various pieces of research can be debated at the 
institutional level. 
 
The establishment of animal ethics committees may give the misleading 
impression that the only arena of conflict over animals in research is the 
institutional one. It is not, and there is no reason for excluding the loyal 
opposition, and the rest of society, from playing its part in the ethical 
evaluation of science at levels beyond the university and the research 
laboratory.  Most scientists recognize that science is not something above 
the law, and that they have no special authority when it comes to 
assessing the ethical implications of their work. It is surprising, then, that 
so little attention has been given to establishing national committees of 
ethical review, with a broad mandate and a wide  membership. Such 
committees would become part of larger structures of scrutiny which 
would provide some assurance that science and technology is not 
running out of control.  
 
For the purposes of this brief article, I have ignored the standard political 
processes in which animal protection organisations, the media and 
scientific pressure groups already play a part in dealing with contested 
issues. The possibilities for political activity, however, are not limited to 
elections, demonstrations, journalism and lobbying. Given that 
controversy can arise at many levels, the decision to include members of 
the ‘loyal opposition’ in decision-taking at institutional level in no way 
precludes them from having an important role to play at other levels. 
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Being aware that such levels of concern exist is also an incentive for 
establishing structures which can permit societies to explore more of the 
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